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Abstract: We seek to understand both the incidence and the impact of the African political business 
cycle in the light of a literature which has argued that, with major extensions of democracy since the 
1990s, the cycle has both become more intense and has made African political systems more fragile. 
With the help of country-case studies, we argue, first, that the African political business cycle is not 
homogeneous, and is rarely encountered in so-called ‘dominant-party systems’ where a pre-election 
stimulus confers little political advantage. Secondly, we show that, in those countries where a political 
cycle does occur, it does not necessarily cause institutional damage. Whether it does or not depends not 
so much on whether there is an electoral cycle as on whether this calms or exacerbates fears of an unjust 
allocation of resources. In other words, the composition of the pre-election stimulus, in terms of its 
allocation between different categories of voter, is as important as its size. 
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The African political business cycle: varieties of experience 
 
1.Introduction         
                  For well over a century, the economies of industrialised countries have been 
subject to systematic economic fluctuations, often known as business cycles. No 
amount of macroeconomic management has been able to get rid of these cycles, and 
many have claimed that governments within a democratic system have an incentive to 
stimulate rather than restrain a pattern of ‘stop-go’ in their policies. It is tempting, for 
example, to buy popularity by boosting the economy before an election, for example 
through tax cuts or monetary expansion, knowing that the costs of doing this, for 
example, in terms of increased inflation, may not be foreseen by voters2, and in any 
case do not have to be paid until after the election has been won. At that point, the 
government may well choose to deflate the economy, both in order to pay for the pre-
election boost and possibly also to restrain wage claims by making the workforce fear 
for their jobs3. Thus, the political process may of itself tend to augment rather than 
restrain the business cycle – as observed in a number of Western industrialised 
countries and analysed by, for example, Kalecki (1943), Nordhaus (1975), one of the 
present authors (Mosley, 1978)4, and Rogoff (1990). And the now firmly embedded 
global economic environment of open capital markets may, as many have discovered to 
their cost during the recent global recession, amplify the ease with which such shocks 
once administered can be passed on to other countries ( Adrian and Shin, 2007). 
       Especially between the 1970s and the 1990s, the whole world became subject to 
pressures, both towards economic openness (in the developing world generally known 
as ‘structural adjustment’), and in many cases also towards democracy, and studies 
from various parts of the developing world have examined the extent to which these 
pressures have translated into political business cycles. Particularly in parts of Latin 
America in the 1980s (Remmer, 1993)5, and in Russia in the 1990s (Treisman and 
Gimpelson, 2001), analysts have found that the emergence of a more open politics was 
followed by the emergence of a political business cycle. In Africa also, where more than 
twenty developing countries are estimated to have held competitive legislative elections 
for the first time between 1990 and 1994 (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997), it might be 
expected that governments would take advantage of the new scope for setting policy 
instruments so as to win elections; and two studies using African data from the early 
                                                 
2
 There is now a big theoretical literature on whether or not this is true (see for example chapter 7 of Drazen (2003)) 
and on whether or not partisanship, towards left or right, plays a role in activating the cycle. The approach taken 
here visualises that voters act rationally to maximise their utility but are ill-informed; and that, at any rate, the swing 
voters who determine the outcomes of elections are without partisanship and vote pragmatically for the party that 
will make them better off in the short term – formally, this is a rational, opportunistic approach to the cycle with 
imperfectly informed voters. But even with perfect information, cycles can still happen (Drazen, 2003: 250ff.) 
though the pre-election boost may be smaller if governments have large majorities and do not need to behave 
opportunistically(Schultz, 1995) 
3
 This belief underlay one of the first expositions of the political business cycle – Kalecki’s Political Quarterly 
paper of 1943 (Kalecki, 1943). 
4
  Empirical studies often but not always confirm the presence of a political element in the business cycle. For a 
summary of findings, see Alesina et al (1997).  
5
 Remmer’s findings are ambiguous: she finds evidence of a political business cycle in Peru and Argentina, but not 
in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. 
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1980s and 1990s (Schuknecht, 1996; Block, 2002) have argued that there is indeed, 
averaging across African countries, a significant tendency for the government fiscal 
deficit to be higher in the years before elections, and to be reduced thereafter. 
               As some of the above studies have acknowledged, political business cycles in 
the developing and transitional world differ in several ways from the cycles found in 
industrialised countries. In the first place, they are often not encountered at all, as 
emphasised in particular by Remmer’s study of Latin America (1993). In a number of 
developing countries, pre-election boosts are not administered, because they are not 
seen as necessary or helpful to the incumbent government.  In African political systems, 
one particularly important reason for this is that the incumbent is a ‘dominant party’, so 
far ahead of rival parties in its share of the vote that pre-election boosts have little value 
from the point of view of winning elections (for example, Botswana, Nigeria, Uganda, 
South Africa). Thus it is important to make an initial distinction between the cases where 
a pre-election boost serves a useful political purpose and those where it does not6. 
             Secondly, in those cases where a cycle does exist, the instruments used to 
activate the cycle may be different from those used in industrial countries. In many 
developing and transitional countries, for example, such as the case of Russia 
examined by Treisman and Gimpelson (2001), consumer debt is small and mortgage 
interest rates are not the important instrument of political persuasion that they are in 
high-income countries. In the Russian case, the instrument by which the economy was 
manipulated in pre-election periods was not interest rates or taxes, or even the 
government budget, but mainly the minimum wage - a gesture which could be expected 
to impact on the livelihoods of most voters (Treisman and Gimpelson, 2001: 239)7. And 
across Africa also, there is great inter-country variation between the instruments 
through which the pre-election boost is administered. As illustrated by Adam and 
O’Connell (2006), African governments have since the 1980s shifted from a pattern of 
‘fiscal dominance’ in which fiscal policy, often in the grip of special interest groups, is the 
driving force and monetary policy accommodates these, to a situation in which central 
banks have much more power and independence and, as a consequence, the ability of 
governments to achieve discretionary adjustments in fiscal policy is greatly muted, with 
monetary policy much more significant. However, this evolution towards reduced fiscal 
dominance is highly variable across countries (Adam and O’Connell, 2006: Table 5.1). 
Adam and O’Connell distinguish between three groups, ‘mature stabilisers’ (e.g. 
Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda) in which the transition to monetary dominance is 
complete, ‘pre-stabilisation cases’ (e.g. Zimbabwe, DRC and Nigeria) in which it has not 
                                                 
6
 For an analysis which makes this distinction, emphasising that governments who are sure of being re-elected do 
not require a pre-election boost, see the paper by Schultz(1995). 
7
 Thus, in the months prior to the presidential referendum of April 1993, the ‘emergency’ parliamentary election of 
December 1993 (which followed the storming of the Duma) and December 1995, and the presidential election of 
June 1996, there is a significant increase in the real minimum wage of between 0.16 and 2.18% and, except in the 
first case, an increase in the real minimum pension also, resulting in an immediate increase in the real average wage 
and a decline in real wage arrears (Treisman and Gimpelson 2001: Table 1) Treisman and Gimpelson explain very 
clearly why the minimum wage in Russia has such leverage:  
‘ First, adjustments to the minimum wage occur through a very public political process, and thus constitute a 
political signal that is far more visible to most voters than change in, say, the average real wage. Secondly, all public 
sector wages are based on a uniform scale anchored to the minimum wage, and social allowances and family 
benefits are also calculated with reference to the official minimum wage. Therefore, any increase in the minimum 
wage is likely to have a broader social impact. (Treisman and Gimpelson 2001, p. 239). 
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begun, and an intermediate ‘low institutional credibility’ group (e.g. Mozambique, 
Ethiopia) in which the move away from fiscal dominance has begun but is contested, 
typically between reformers in the central bank, ministry of finance and aid donors, 
anxious to limit fiscal dominance, and spending departments often anxious to preserve 
a measure of such dominance. The outcome of this power struggle is clearly important 
for understanding variations in observed behaviours within the political business cycle. 
                   Thirdly, the ability of developing countries to finance a pre-election boost 
depends, much more than in industrialised countries, on their relationships with the 
international financial system and in particular, in the case of the small open economies 
of Africa, on their relationships with aid donors, who finance a large part of their 
development expenditure and much of their recurrent expenditure also8. In much of 
Africa, setting aside cases of atypical fiscal strength such as Botswana, Mauritius and 
South Africa, a political business cycle cannot occur unless the donors agree to finance 
it. It might be expected a priori that donor behaviour would correlate well with ‘fiscal 
dominance’, as discussed above, which donors are certainly keen to eliminate, as a 
symptom of the dominance of special political interests over the principle of fiscal 
responsibility. In fact, the relationship is much more complex: several countries in the 
category of ‘pre-stabilisation cases’ with high fiscal dominance, such as Ghana, in fact 
enjoy excellent relationships with aid donors9. The evidence indeed suggests that 
factors other than fiscal rectitude, including in particular willingness to initiate pro-poor 
programmes and to practise good governance, weigh more with donors in determining 
their ability to secure high and stable flows of budget support assistance (Mosley and 
Suleiman, 2006). What is clear, however, is that the behaviour of aid donors is often an 
important determinant of the intensity of political cycles, and needs to be factored into 
any analysis of them in poorer developing countries such as those of Africa. 
  
 
           In this paper, we examine the incidence of political business cycles in 
Africa in a manner which attempts to do justice to these inter-country variations in 
political and economic environment. We are interested in assessing the effects of cycles 
as well as their incidence, since it has been suggested by some commentators that 
specifically in developing countries with fragile states, there may be a price to pay for 
greater democracy, in the shape of weakened fiscal discipline and greater institutional 
vulnerability. For example, Block’s analysis of the African political business cycle 
(2002), which uncovers strong evidence of a cycle across a panel of 44 countries 
between 1980-95, has warned that: 
                                                 
8
 Across the 21 countries in our sample (listed in table 1 below) the ratio of aid to total government expenditure, 
averaged across the years 1980 to 2008, was 38.4 per cent, but the ratio of aid to all investment (not just government 
investment) was 85.4 per cent (data from World Bank, World Development Indicators). In other words, in a number 
of countries aid flows were financing a great deal more than the whole of the government capital budget. 
9
 See Adam and O’Connell (2006), table  5.1.   
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               Africa, along with many countries in Latin America and the former Soviet Union, is currently 
engaged in long-term processes of economic and political reform. Yet, Africa is unique in the intensity of 
these dual challenges, as well as in its relatively limited institutional development. It is, in short, a context 
not only particularly ripe for political business cycles, but also one in which such cycles may imply 
particularly acute problems for the compatibility of economic and political reform. The electorally 
motivated macroeconomic interventions found in this paper directly undermine ongoing economic reform 
programs, which are predicated on reducing deficits, restraining money growth and inflation, and 
liberalising foreign exchange regimes and capital markets. Are economic and political reform friends or 
foes? (Block, 2002: 224)    
 
                     The evidence which we present in this paper suggests that they are usually 
friends, but that the impact of the political cycle depends, as discussed above, on the 
composition of public expenditure between different interest-groups. In the next section, 
section 2, we present the sample and illustrate some of the variations of experience 
within it by means of country case studies. In section 3 we examine the proposition that 
the political business cycle causes institutional damage, and in particular the idea that 
the impact of the cycle may depend on the composition of any pre-election boost in 
expenditure. Section 4 concludes and presents implications for policy. 
 
 
2. Evidence of election-cycle effects in Africa 
                We wish first of all to understand whether an election-cycle mechanism is 
present in Africa, and if so where. Accordingly we begin by estimating the following 
single-equation model for a sample of 51 African countries (including the 21 
summarised in Table 1 below: 
 
Ii,t = β0i + β1ELE i,t + β2ELEPOSTi,t + β3AIDPCi,t + β4DEMOCi,t + β iIi,t− j∑ + µi,t     (1) 
 
where: 
It = policy instrument subject to variation in an election year; 
ELEi,t, = a dummy variable taking the value 1 in an election year and 0 in a non-
election year; 
ELEPOST = a dummy variable taking the value 1 in a post-election year and 0 in 
a non-election year; 
AIDPC = the value of aid disbursements per capita; 
DEMOC=measure of how democratic the system of governance is;10 
j = length of lag applicable to pre-election stimulus; 
µ = random error term.  
Of the 51 countries, 12 have limited or no data on budget deficit, one of the dependent 
variables. 
 
           Equation (1) is a modified simplest version of the original Nordhaus 
‘opportunistic’ political business cycle model, in which the incumbent government 
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 From www.systemicpeace.org. We find this variable generally more plausible and complete than other indicators 
of democracy in the Quality of Government Dataset. 
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stimulates the economy before an election in order to maximise its share of the vote at 
election time, but is forced to cut back on expenditure after the election in order to re-
establish fiscal balance and prevent a run on the reserves11. The policy instruments 
considered are the budget deficit (total government revenue less total government 
expenditure), and money supply as shares of GDP. Per capita aid is added into the 
model to reflect the dependence of expenditure on aid flows, as discussed above. 
 
            The sample against which this equation is estimated is described in Table 1, 
which also indicates the timing of elections in each country and whether or not there is a 
‘dominant party’, in the sense indicated on page 3.  
 
Table 1: The sample 
 
Country Population 
(millions, 
2008) 
Colonial status Aid  flows, 
mean value 
1990-2008: 
Dominant 
party? (2) 
Elections(3) 
   % 
GNI 
$ 
per 
capita 
  
Botswana 2 British 1.6 50.4 yes Oct.1984,89,1994,Oct.1999, 
Oct.2004, Oct.2009 
Cameroon 17 Anglo-French 5.7 44.0 no April 1980, Jan. 1984, Apr.1988, 
Oct.1992, Oct. 1997, Oct.2004 
Cote d’Ivoire 18 French 6.1 39.9 no Oct.1980, Oct. 1985, Oct.1990 
DRC 59 Belgian 14.8 17.4 no June 1984, July 2007 
Ethiopia 73 Italian (1920s 
and 1930s only) 
11.9 18.8 no May-June1995,May-Aug. 2000, May 
– Aug. 2005 
Ghana 23 British 10.6 40.9 no Nov.1992,1996,Dec. 2000,Dec.2004, 
Dec.2008 
Kenya 35 British 6.1 22.3 no Sept.1983, March 1988, Dec. 1992, 
Dec.1997, Dec.2002, Dec. 2007 
Madagascar 19 French 13.3 35.4 no Nov.1982, March 1989, Feb. 1993, 
Dec.2001, Dec.2006 
Malawi 13 British 24.4 44.4 no May 1994, June 1999, May 2004, 
May 2009 
Mauritania 3 French 17.8 100.2 no Jan. 1992, Dec. 1997, Nov. 2003, 
March 2007, July 2009 
Mauritius 1 Anglo-French 0.9 30.1 yes Not included in this analysis 
Mozambique 20 Portuguese 36.8 69.3 yes Oct. 1994, Dec. 1999, Dec. 2004, 
Oct. 2009 
Nigeria 145 British 1.5 9.5 yes Aug. 1983, June 1993, Feb. 1999, 
April 2003, April 2007 
Rwanda 9 Belgian 25.9 61.1 yes December 1983, Dec 1988,2003 
Senegal 12 French 8.2 65.0 yes Feb. 1983, Feb. 1988, Feb. 1993, 
March 2000, Feb. 2007 
South Africa 47 Anglo-Dutch 0.3 11.8 yes April 1994, June 1999, April 2004, 
April 2009 
Tanzania 39 British (German 
1890-1918) 
16.9 38.7 yes Oct. 1980, Oct. 1985, Oct. 1990, Oct. 
1995, Oct. 2000, Dec. 2005 
Togo 6 French 7.8 25.6 yes Dec.1986, Aug.1993, June 1998, 
June 2003, April 2005 
Uganda 30 British 15.2 37.0 Yes March 2001, February 2006 
Zambia 12 British 22.8 88.1 No Oct.1983, Oct. 1988, Oct. 1991, 
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 See Drazen (2004) chapter 8. This is in essence the same  model as that estimated by Block (2002), except that per 
capita aid flows are used in (1) as an independent variable  in place of aid disbursements. 
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Nov.1996, Dec.2001, Sept. 
2006,2008. 
Zimbabwe 13 British 5.3 29.8 No March 1990, March 1996, March 
2002, March/June 2008 
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM, except election data which are from http://psephos. adam-
carr.net/indexes/index_a.shtml. Data may be inspected at and downloaded from www. poverty.group. shef.ac.uk. 
Notes.  
(1)Estimation period is 1980-2009. 
(2) Dominant parties are those which have held more than 60% of the vote in all elections since 1990, as classified by Salih (2003: 
Table  8.5). 
(3) Dates of presidential elections only are included in the table. 
 
         In table 2, we report the results of equation (1) using a fixed effects estimator12. It 
may be argued that since the equation is dynamic, running a fixed effects model results 
in (large sample) bias in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (Baum, 2006). 
First, this does not affect our variable(s) of interest – election dummies; and second, this 
bias, of order 1/T, declines as the number of time periods increases (NIckell, 1981). Our 
T averages 22 observations per country. In addition, this problem can be corrected by 
differencing and then running and instrumental variable estimator. This approach will be 
applied to the more detailed comparative models in Section 3 where we apply system 
GMM estimators and show that our conclusions for the variables of interest do not 
change. 
 
The equation is estimated separately for the sample as a whole and for countries 
without dominant parties – where, as discussed above, a pre-election stimulus is more 
necessary for the purposes of winning an election. A country is defined as having a 
dominant party if the largest party in legislature capture 60% or more of the votes. 
Across the sample as a whole, the expected pre-election stimulus is weakly significant  
(at the 5% but not at the 1% level) as a predictor of the budget deficit only in the ‘no 
dominant party’ group where we expect electoral competition to be more intense, but 
not across the sample as a whole. The post-election cutback expected by the Nordhaus 
model again does not materialise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 We have run a Hausman test to decide on the most appropriate estimator between the fixed effects and the random 
effects estimators, and chose the former. 
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  Table 2: Preliminary evidence of election-cycle effects 
    
 Full model No dominant party model 
Dependent variable Budget deficit Money supply to 
GDP 
Budget deficit Money supply to 
GDP 
Budget deficit 1st lag 0.401***  0.230***                 
 (0.0513)  (0.0726)                 
Budget deficit 2nd lag 0.088*  -0.262***                 
 (0.0501)  (0.0653)                 
Election year dummy -0.712** 0.301 -1.512** 1.345*** 
 (0.344) (0.198) (0.612) (0.417)    
Post-election year dummy 1.052** -0.484* 0.528 -0.523    
 (0.416) (0.248) (0.472) (0.602)    
Aid per capita 0.002 -0.004 -0.016 0.019**  
 (0.0107) (0.00239) (0.0203) (0.00771)    
Index of democracy 0.017 0.014 -0.186 0.256**  
 (0.0620) (0.0866) (0.118) (0.106)    
Time variable 0.049 0.036 -0.012 0.056    
 (0.0300) (0.0285) (0.0393) (0.0559)    
Money supply/GDP 1st lag  0.924***  0.824*** 
  (0.0861)  (0.101)    
Money supply/GDP 2nd lag  -0.065  -0.041    
  (0.0603)  (0.0816)    
Constant -4.285*** 2.168 -1.648 0.440    
 (1.456) (1.841) (2.200) (2.221)    
     
Observations 462 664 131 207    
R2 0.271 0.702 0.219 0.687    
F Statistic 47.9 52.4 5.3 189.3   
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
NB: we report only the lags that were statistically significant. 
We can delete the second lag of money supply in the two equations because its not significant. 
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are Student’s t-statistics. *** after a coefficient denotes significance at the 1% level, **denotes 
significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at 10% level. Period of estimation: 1980-2008. Estimation method|:OLS with 
fixed effects. 
 
Sources:  election timings from table 1; aid per capita from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM; fiscal dominance 
from Adam and McConnell (2006), Table 5 ; dominant party status from Salih (2003). 
 
 
 
We interpret the weak, election-year coefficient in Table 2 – just significant at the 
5% level and much weaker than that reported by Block, albeit his data relate to an 
earlier sample period13 – as evidence that the African election cycle is variable across, 
and possibly even within, the country groups of Table 1, and now investigate the 
possible causes of this variance with the help of country case studies. 
 Our case-studies relate to Ghana, Zambia and Kenya,  - all of them countries in 
which multi-party competition for the presidency has been active since the beginning of 
                                                 
13
  Block (2002, tables 2 and  3) reported a significant coefficient of the election year dummy ELE (in OLS 
regressions for 1980-1995) on the nominal interest rate, government consumption, and net claims on government, 
and a significant coefficient of the post-election dummy ELEPOST on the fiscal deficit, the government 
consumption/GDP ratio,  and inflation.   
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the 1990s, i.e. there is currently no ‘dominant party’, as per the criteria of Table 114.  The 
course of the political business cycle between 1980 and the present is that there is an 
active cycle in Ghana and Zambia – in the sense that in each election year there is a 
noticeable increase in the budget deficit, most of it triggered by variations in government 
spending rather than in the tax ratio. In Kenya, no cyclical increase in the budget deficit 
is observable, except in 2007.  In seeking to understand this difference, it may be 
significant that, of the three countries, Kenya is the only one falling into Adam and 
O’Connell’s category of ‘mature stabilisers’ (Adam and O’Connell 2006, Table 5.1) – in 
other words, countries in which an independent central bank imposes so much restraint 
on the budget that it can, only with difficulty, finance cyclical boosts in government 
expenditure. On this criterion, Zambia and Ghana both fall into the ‘pre-stabilisation’ 
category, with moderate inflation in the 15-25% range, and relatively high and unstable 
budget deficits. 
 
However, there are some puzzles still embedded in these data, not the least of 
which is that  Zambia and Kenya, which made strenuous attempts to rid themselves of 
their fiscal deficits over the period 1990-2008, experienced strained and unstable 
relationships with aid donors over the period15, whereas Ghana, whose fiscal control 
was much looser and which lived with an inflation rate averaging over 20% over the 
entire period, enjoyed an excellent and stable relationship with aid donors over the 
same period, interrelated with its anti-poverty performance – indeed, Ghana halved its 
poverty level between 1991 and 2006 (Nuamah, Teal and Awoonor-Williams, 2010), a 
performance matched only by Uganda across the whole of Africa. We may be able to 
understand these puzzles if we bring into the story characteristics going beyond the 
formal observance of democratic and fiscal orthodoxy – in particular, the quality of 
governance and of the pre-election boost that was applied in each of these cases. 
Ghana is perhaps the country which in the whole of Africa,  since 1992, has 
made the most strenuous efforts to consolidate its advances in democratic practice, 
achieved inter alia through reforms in electoral practice, involvement of foreign 
observers in monitoring of elections and a drive to increase the electoral participation 
rate (Fridy, 2007;  Branch and Cheeseman, 2008;  Whitfield, 2009). Each of the five 
elections since 1992 has been tightly contested between the National Democratic 
Congress and the New Patriotic Party. At each of the five elections (won by the NDC in 
1992  and in 1996, the NPP in 2000 and 2004, and by the NDC again in 2008) the 
incumbent parties, respectively rooted in the (Ewe-speaking) south-east and  the 
(Ashanti) south-centre of the country, have aimed their pre-election boost outwards from 
these ‘safe seats’ towards regions and interest-groups in which they perceive 
themselves as having the biggest chances of picking up uncommitted votes – namely 
                                                 
14
 The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) was often styled as a dominant party in Zambia during the 
1990s (e.g. in the book by Salih (2003)).  
15
 Between 1990 -2 and 2008, Zambia halved its budget deficit (the Easterly ea_gbds measure in the World Bank 
World Development Indicators) from 10.5 to 5.5 per cent, whereas Ghana’s scarcely changed at all (declining only 
from  10.4% to 10.2%)  . However, the aid donors’ behaviour was not related to these improvements in budgetary 
discipline. Ghana is the only country of the three to have a Grade 1 CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment) rating from the World Bank, and Ghana was the only one of the three countries to achieve during the 
2000s PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility budget support credit) from the IMF and World Bank.  Very 
likely as a consequence, Ghana’s aid flows (table 3 below) were more stable than those of the other two countries.. 
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towards the farmers of the poor Northern region in the case of the NDC, and towards 
wage-workers in Accra in the case of both parties (Fridy, 2007, especially maps on pp. 
287 and 288). Each of these  groups contains a high proportion of low-income people, 
and the fact that a high proportion of the pre-election expenditure increase in each of 
these years went to the health, education and social protection sectors, which have a 
high propensity to reach low-income groups (table 4 below) enabled the pre-election 
stimulus to be more effectively targeted both on ‘floating voters’ and uncommitted voters 
who in many cases had not previously voted (Fridy, 2007) – to the benefit of the 
incumbent party – and on low-income groups16 – to the pleasure of the aid donors. 
Delighted both by the improvements in governance and by the rapid fall in poverty from 
1991 onwards,  the donors decided to condone Ghana’s persistingly slack macro-
economic performance17  and throughout the subsequent twenty years have rewarded 
the Ghana government with high and stable aid flows, within the framework of  the 
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (table 3).  
 
The case of Kenya is in many ways opposite.  No election-year budgetary boost 
by the incumbent party is perceptible in any year except 2007 (part of which is 
explained by the fact that the Central Bank of Kenya enjoys a high degree of 
independence, which has enabled it to keep the budget deficit consistently under 
control). Judged both on the quality of elections and on the level of corruption, Kenya’s 
governance record was poor throughout the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi from 1978 to 
2002; the gradual realisation of this by aid donors eventually motivated them to cool 
their previously warm relationships with the Kenyan administration. The 2002 election, 
won by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under the former finance minister Mwai 
Kibaki, promised progress in terms of inter-ethnic fairness, electoral propriety and a 
diminution of corruption, but before any of these advances had been properly 
embedded, or accepted as such by donors, they were thrown into reverse18, and a claim 
by the opposition that the December 2007 elections had been rigged led to widespread 
rioting between supporters of the two main parties in January and February 2008, with 
over 1000 deaths. As a result, a clear opportunity to create a Ghana-type situation of 
competition between two parties drawing their support from a national, rather than an 
ethnic or regional, base was thrown away.  In face of the threat of state collapse, 
however, a power-sharing deal between PNU and ODM was brokered in April 2008, 
and this has so far held. 
 
Zambia represents an intermediate case. During the early 2000s the ruling 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) lost its dominant-party status in face of a 
determined challenge from, in particular, the Patriotic Front (PF) led by Michael Sata.  
During this period there was also an improvement in the quality of elections, and the 
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 Ehrhart (2010, page 4 )  also identifies taxation, specifically reductions in excise duties on petroleum, as being a 
factor by which the votes of the uncommitted Ghanaian  poor were sought just before the  2008 election. 
17
 Ghana’s macro-economic performance is classified by Adam and O’Connell within the ‘pre-stabilisation’ 
category, with inflation over 20% at the beginning of the 2000s (Adam and O’Connell 2006, table 5.1) 
18
 One important factor causing deterioration of governance after 2002 was fragmentation of authority within the 
National Rainbow Coalition (now Party of National Unity or PNU) elite. Well before the catastrophic 2007 election, 
rival ministers within (PNU) were sponsoring vigilante gangs, two of them known as the ‘Taliban’ and the ‘Baghdad 
Boys’  with the objective of intimidating other factions within the party (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008:      15) 
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2006 and 2008 elections were substantially cleaner than those of the 1990s and early 
2000s (Larmer and Fraser, 2007; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009:  69-70).  As inter-
party competition became more intense, so, as in Ghana, both parties found themselves 
seeking to transcend the existing ethnic base of their parties by competing for the 
support of uncommitted groups – the principal battleground, in Zambia, being urban 
workers on the Copperbelt. Within this zone, Sata’s Patriotic Front made a particular 
pitch for the loyalty of a ‘coalition of the dispossessed…putting the living conditions of 
the urban poor at the heart of political debates’ (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009:  64). 
Especially during the run-up to the 2006 election (and within the pre-election boost of 
that year), the response of President Levy Mwanawasa’s MMD was to seek to emulate 
Sata’s populist appeal and in particular many of his more popular policies, including the 
idea of a windfall tax on copper, an increase in the royalty on mineral rights19 and a 
series of  tax cuts ‘which Mwanawasa accepted were a direct response to “criticism over 
high taxes during the election campaign” ‘(Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009:  65). 
However, the adoption of this quasi-Ghanaian approach to inter-party competition, 
focussed on the uncommitted urban poor, did not achieve anything like Ghana’s degree 
of success in broad-based, poverty-reducing development. Although the data are 
disputed, there is as yet no firm evidence that even after several years of growth 
poverty levels have come down from their very high levels of the 1990s. Observing this, 
and apparently not yet completely convinced that good governance has come to stay, 
the trusting donor-recipient relationships that are apparent in Ghana have not yet 
arrived in Zambia, and aid flows are as a consequence lower and more unstable20.  
                                                 
19
 These increased taxes on natural resources were explicitly aimed at increasing investment in the social service 
sector (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 65). This linking of export taxation and social services expenditure, 
explicitly framed as a gesture towards greater fiscal equity, is very reminiscent of similar ‘neo-developmentalist’ 
initiatives in Latin America during the 2000s – notably in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela – where 
export taxes have also been aimed at deriving a political dividend from a fairer reallocation of the country’s natural 
resources (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009: Chapter 1).  
20
 See note 13 above. 
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 Table 3 sums up our comparison between the factors underlying the electoral cycle in 
the three case-study countries. 
 
 
Table 3: Election cycles in case-study countries and possible causes 
 
 
Ghana Zambia Kenya 
Evidence for an 
election cycle 
Yes – strengthening 
over time 
Yes – constant No (except in 2007) 
Governance and 
institutions 
 
Clean elections, low 
corruption,  
Generally good 
institutional 
performance e.g. rising 
tax ratios 
Elections once dubious, 
clean in 2006 and 
2008, corruption fairly 
severe, improving 
institutional 
performance? 
Elections generally 
dubious (although 2002 
cleaner) 
Relations with aid 
donors 
Excellent since 1980s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Average level of 
aid/GNP = 10.6% 
 
Coefficient of variation 
(CV) of aid flows = 37% 
 
Probationary since 
early 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
Average level of 
aid/GNP =22.8% 
 
CV of aid flows = 59% 
 
Poor 1990-2002, 
improved 2002-8, 
probationary since 
disturbances of January 
2008 
 
 
Average level of 
aid/GNP =6.1% 
 
CV of aid flows = 55% 
 
Focus for inter-
party competition 
 
Urban workers in 
Accra;  also low-income 
rural areas e.g. Upper 
Region 
Urban poor Urban poor and small-
scale farm households 
Content of pre-
election stimulus: 
pro-poor 
expenditure (PPE) 
ratio 
8.0 6.0 5.6 
Poverty trend 1990 
to date 
Halved in 15 years 
(from 51% to 27%) 
No change (constant at 
68% 1990-2005) 
No change overall. 
Available data suggest 
increase during 1990s, 
possible decline 
thereafter. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. ‘Pro-poor expenditure (PPE) ratio is defined as  (public expenditure)* 
expenditure share, where expenditure share=(education+health+social protection- military)/total expenditure. 
 
 The main message which we derive from this discussion is that under African 
conditions the character of inter-party competition, and in consequence the impact of 
the political business cycle, are not at all homogeneous, but rather are determined by 
three inter-related factors. Firstly the quality of governance and institutions, and second, 
the composition of public expenditure in general and the pre-election stimulus in 
particular, both impact on a third key causal factor, interrelationships with aid donors. 
We thus have the beginnings of an explanation of how the possible negative institutional 
impacts of the business cycle, about which Block and others have expressed concerns, 
may vary across cases. In the next section, we attempt a formal test of these ideas. 
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3. Institutional impact of the political business cycle 
   Several commentators on Africa, as we saw21, have worried that the political 
business cycle might impose breaking strains on institutional capacity and possibilities 
for sustained reform. In particular, they have worried that pre-election surges in 
spending might prove difficult to reverse, thereby presenting African governments with 
an unpleasant choice between surrendering to the cycle and thereby wrecking fiscal 
discipline, or alternatively re-imposing that discipline so drastically that the state 
collapses into anarchy (which was the outcome of the political business cycle process, 
for example, in Sierra Leone in the 1980s)22.  Africa has, of course, a very high density 
of fragile states23, suggesting that the risk of increased state vulnerability from this 
cause is real; and of course, well short of state collapse, there is a good deal of 
evidence suggesting that increased volatility has welfare costs (Ramey and Ramey, 
1995:  Hudson and Mosley, 2008). Thus, if an amplified political business cycle 
increases overall volatility within a fragile economic system, and if increased overall 
volatility damages institutions, then there is cause for worry.  
 Do these worries apply in practice? Our case-study evidence suggests that it all 
depends on the quality of economic management around election time. In particular, it 
has argued that, in those cases where an election cycle prevails, its impact on 
governance would be determined by three things: aid flows, quality of governance (in 
particular, the quality of election management) and the composition, in the sense of 
allocation between interest-groups, of the pre-election boost. In Ghana, a progressive 
orientation of public expenditure and a proactive determination to consolidate 
democratic electoral processes motivated donors to provide aid on terms which 
prevented the very active political business cycle in the budget deficit from turning into a 
cycle in personal disposable income24; in Zambia, these trends also became apparent 
but much later in the day, in the mid 2000s, leaving donors agnostic about whether true 
improvements in governance were under way, so that the cycle in the budget deficit was 
mirrored in a cycle in personal disposable income; in Kenya, there is generally very little 
evidence of any cycle, and  donors at most times had a poor relationship with the 
government, so that on the one occasion that a cycle did threaten institutional damage, 
in 2007, the donors were in no mood to put a protective safety-net around the economy, 
and the result was violence which took the Kenyan state to the edge of breakdown. 
                                                 
21
 See page 4 above; see also Chua (2004) who ‘goes as far as to suggest that elections in most African countries 
should be postponed until a suitable socio-economic context can be developed’. Branch and Cheeseman (2008:22). 
22
 For the detail of the Sierra Leone case, see the book by Weeks (1991) 
23
 On the Polity IV map, which provides a measure of ‘state fragility’, 19 out of 22 countries classified by Polity IV 
as having ‘high’ or ‘extreme’ levels of fragility are in Africa. The index is displayed at  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
24
 Ghana was a relatively rare case of donors achieving a countercyclical pattern of aid flows. Empirically it has 
been common for donors to provide aid in a manner which amplifies rather than damping the cycle (Bulir and 
Hamann 2003, 2008, Mosley and Hudson 2008) 
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 On this view, the sequence of actions around the time of an election is important 
in determining the consequences of the cycle.  Governments, we argue, send through 
their public expenditure allocations, signals to internal and external interest-groups 
(including aid donors) concerning the interest-groups which they identify with and 
concerning the principles by which they intend to arbitrate between conflicting claims 
(Hudson, Lenton and Mosley, 2011). These signals can be conveyed by shifts in 
expenditure around election time from budgets which are not easy to target on swing 
voters to those which are25, and amongst those which are targetable we identify, as a 
group both politically uncommitted and important for political stability, the urban poor. 
Those African governments which have reoriented their public expenditure patterns and 
in particular their pre-election stimulus in a pro-poor direction, as Ghana and Zambia did 
in our illustrations, may be interpreted as sending a signal that they are attempting, in 
their expenditure allocations, to go beyond the ethnic and regional loyalties of their 
‘heartlands’26, and to allocate expenditure on broader principles of equity. Such 
behaviour is of course consistent with the Millennium Development Goals, and likely to 
be supported by the donors in the context of a long-term dialogue on institutional 
improvement. In such a case, it is improbable that institutional reform will be imperilled 
by the ups and downs (or rather, ups – we cannot, as shown in table 3,  find significant 
evidence in Africa of post-election correction) of the political business cycle. 
 Similar considerations apply to electoral processes. Where government is 
engaged in a process of insulating electoral institutions from ruling-party pressure and 
reinforcing the transparency of the electoral process (as was conspicuously the case in 
Ghana throughout 1992-2008, and lately has applied in Zambia also), this will also be 
welcomed by donors, and strengthen the recipient’s case for inclusion in arrangements 
such as the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), an arrangement 
which provides stable long-term budget support, and thereby also mitigates any 
institutional damage which may be caused by the cycle. 
            Our hypothesis is, therefore, that in those cases where an election cycle is 
visible, its impact on the economy depends on the context of government behaviour 
around the election. Specifically, we expect that negative impacts on institutions will be 
insignificant in those cases where the pre-election stimulus is ‘progressive’, in the sense 
of being directed in a manner that is generally pro-poor in intention rather than being 
aimed at the well-being of a specific ethnic or regional group, and where it is ‘clean’, in 
                                                 
25
 Many thanks to Vera Troeger for emphasising this point to us. For a model which also argues that compositional 
effects may be important in determining the effectiveness of the pre-election boost, see Drazen and Eslava (2010). 
Our own approach was conceived independently of the Drazen-Eslava model and uses a different measure of 
‘favoured composition of government expenditure’ from theirs. In our model, the ‘politically sensitive expenditures’ 
which are prioritised ahead of an election are pro-poor expenditures; in theirs, infrastructure expenditures are 
prioritised (Drazen and Eslava 2010: (14)). 
26
 That is, in Ghana, the Ewe provided the traditional heartland of the NDC and the Ashanti of the NPP), and in 
Zambia, varied ethnic groups of the Copperbelt region provide the heartland of the MMD and the Bemba the 
heartland of the Patriotic Party. 
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the sense of being unaccompanied by ballot-rigging. But they may be serious in those 
cases where a pre-election boost is perceived as aggravating rather than easing 
existing inter-personal and inter-ethnic unfairnesses in the distribution of power and 
assets. 
In Table 4, we examine this hypothesis in relation to an enlarged case-study 
group including the case-study countries of the previous section – Ghana, Zambia and 
Kenya, and also in relation to the 21-country sample as a whole. The size of any pre-
election boost is measured in the extreme left-hand column of the table. We wish to test 
the hypothesis that this will be influenced firstly by institutional quality, and secondly by 
the context in which elections are conducted.  The dependent variables measuring 
‘institutional quality’, in columns 4 to 6 of the table, are three: 
(1) A ‘state fragility index’. This is conceived as a measure of exposure to conflict 
in relation to the capacity of state institutions to manage that conflict. 
Exposure to conflict is transcribed from the PRIO ucdp_loc index on the scale 
3=war, 2= intermediate conflict, 1= minor conflict, 0 = no significant civil 
conflict. The capacity of state institutions to manage and anticipate conflict is 
taken from the POLITY IV index27 and measured on a seven-point scale, 
where 7 denotes ‘extreme incapacity/fragility’’ and  0 denotes ‘high 
institutional capacity/little or no fragility’ on that index of state capacity. Adding 
the exposure index to the state capacity index thus produces a 10-point 
‘composite fragility scale’, with 10 the upper extreme and 0 the lower extreme, 
which is the measure reported in Table 4.   
(2) Tax capacity, measured in terms of the tax/GDP ratio. This measure of 
institutional capacity has been widely used in quantitative studies (e.g. 
Brautigam and Knack 2004). It has the merit of distinguishing those cases in 
which governments are deterred by fear of political opposition or incapacity of 
tax-collecting institutions from broadening the tax base from those cases in 
which these obstacles can be overcome. 
(3) The ‘pro-poor institutions index’. This is a measure of the capacity of 
economic institutions not only to function effectively but also to develop, and 
in particular to enable low-income people to access key markets, including 
labour, capital and infrastructure. It is constructed (Mosley 2012, Table 6.1) 
as the average of the following indices: (i) access to microfinance as a 
proportion of the population; (ii) participation in rural labour markets as a 
proportion of the population; (iii) access to rural infrastructure as a proportion 
of the population; (iv) the Leftwich-Sen-te Velde ‘state-business relations 
index’ (Leftwich et al. 2008), conceived as a quantitative measure of the 
extent to which the state is supportive of private economic institutions. 
 
                                                 
27
  The Polity IV index is displayed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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In addition, we hypothesise that the impact of the pre-election boost will be 
determined by the political context of elections, for which we provide measures in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 4. Column (2) specifies the ‘pro-poor expenditure ratio’, 
defined as the ratio of health, plus education, plus social expenditure, less military 
expenditure, to total expenditure. The first three expenditures in this ratio are typically 
intensive in the labour of low-income workers, and in addition have many low-income 
consumers (especially in the case of primary health and education); military expenditure 
by contrast is capital-intensive and  its level is associated with an increase in the 
probability of conflict28 (Nafziger and Auvinen 2000:  Tables A 3.1 to A3.4 ). We 
therefore reason that a large pre-election boost which increases the ratio of pro-poor 
expenditure to total expenditure will be treated as a signal of commitment by incumbent 
governments to allocate public money in a manner that is broadly equitable rather than 
reflective of existing ethnic and regional partisanship (which will strengthen loyalty to 
public institutions), whereas a pre-election boost which decreases the ratio of pro-poor 
expenditure to total expenditure will do the opposite. Our other measure of electoral 
context, in column (3), is a subjective measure of whether the elections for our selected 
countries were ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’. A ‘dirty’ election is characterised by electoral 
irregularities and rigging.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
  The index which Nafziger and Auvinen use to assess the risk of civil war combines the ratio of military 
expenditure to GNP, as defined above, with a dummy variable for military government into a measure which they 
call ‘military centrality’; this, in their dataset, is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of 
conflict. 
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Table 4: Election cycles and their institutional consequences  
 
 Election-cycle characteristics Dimensions of  state fragility,  
1990 to 2008 
(7)Average 
aid/ gross 
national 
income ratio 
1990-2008 
(IMF 
adjustment 
facilities in 
parentheses) 
 
(8)Poverty 
headcount,1990 
to 2008(8) 
 
(1)Electio
n-year 
deficit as 
%  of 
mean 
budget 
deficit 
 
(2)‘Pro-
poor’ 
content of 
expenditu
re in 
election 
year 
(3)Dirty/ 
clean 
elections 
(4)State 
fragility 
index 
(5) Tax 
GDP ratio 
(6)Pro-
poor 
institutio
ns index 
Ghana 156.4 8.0 Clean since 
1992 
7        5 11       22 106          
185 
Average 
9.1% (on 
falling trend) 
Two 
PRGFs 
51        27 
Zambia 185.0 6.0 Dubious until 
2001, clean 
thereafter 
7        5 19       17  .. Average 
19.5% (on 
falling trend) 
68        68 
Kenya 77.6 5.6 Dirty except 
in 2002 
7        7 18       18 100          
128 
Average 
7.0% (on 
falling trend) 
42         52 
Botswana 183.3 13.2 Clean 4        2 .. .. Average 
3.8% (on 
falling trend) 
No data 
South Africa 79.5 6.9 Fairly clean 
since 1994 
 
7        2 21 .. Average 
0.3% (on 
falling trend) 
32         49 
Ethiopia 152.0 1.8 Mixed;notabl
y dirty in 
2005 
10         7 7 .. Average 
9.8% (on 
rising trend) 
55        54 
Nigeria 127.3 0.4 Generally 
dirty 
4        6 11 .. Average 
1.1%(on 
rising trend) 
37         34 
Uganda 88.8 3.5 Moderately 
clean 
6        6 5 100      
164 
 Average 
12.1% (on 
falling trend) 
 Two PRGFs 
56        33 
Sample 
average 
(n=21 
countries) 
131.6 5.2  6.7       5.2 10.6 .. 7.8% .. 
 Sources and notes. 
(1) Election-year budget deficit as % of mean deficit. From Easterly’s ea_gbds measure of the budget deficit, in University of 
Gothenburg Quality of Government dataset, www.qog.gu.se. 
(2) Pro-poor content of expenditure in election years: from IMF, Government Expenditure Statistics Yearbook (election years 
are as given in Table 1 above). ‘Pro-poor expenditure’ is defined as the ratio of (education expenditure + health 
expenditure + social protection expenditure, less military expenditure) to total expenditure. 
(3) Quality of electoral process: a subjective indication derived from the following accounts of electoral processes:Ghana from 
Fridy(2007); Zambia from Cheeseman and Hinfelaar(2009); Kenya from Branch and Cheeseman(2008); Ethiopia from 
Abbink ( 2005 ) Nigeria from Rawlence and Albin-Lackey(2007) Cross-reference to POLITY index?  
(4) State fragility index: This is conceived as a measure of exposure to conflict and the capacity of  
             state institutions to manage that conflict. Exposure to conflict is transcribed from the PRIO  
ucdp_loc index on the scale 3=war, 2= intermediate conflict, 1= minor conflict, 0 = no significant  
civil conflict. The capacity of state institutions to manage and anticipate conflict is taken from the  
18 
 
POLITY IV index29 and measured on a seven-point scale, where 7 denotes ‘extreme  
incapacity/fragility’’ and  0 denotes ‘high institutional capacity/little or no fragility’ on that index of  
state capacity. Adding the exposure index to the state capacity index thus produces a 10-point  
‘composite fragility scale’, with 10 the upper extreme and 0 the lower extreme, which is the  
measure reported in the table.   
(5) Ratio of tax revenue to GDP, from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
(6) Pro-poor institutions ratio:  is constructed (Mosley et al 2009: Chapter 6, table 6.1) as the average of the following indices: 
(i) access to microfinance as a proportion of the population; (ii) participation in rural labour markets as a proportion of the 
population; (iii) access to rural infrastructure as a proportion of the population; (iv) the Leftwich-Sen-te Velde ‘state-
business relations index’ (Leftwich et al. 2008), conceived as a quantitative measure of the extent to which the state is 
supportive of private economic institutions. 
(7) Aid flow: from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
(8) Poverty headcount: from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
 
 
As will be recalled, the political business cycle mechanism is only found in some 
countries, which are shaded in the first column of Table 4. The main inference which we 
derive from examining these countries is that the political business cycle will damage 
institutional development if and only if government policy is perceived as aggravating 
existing inequities.  In Ghana, Zambia and Botswana, where the pre-election stimulus is 
strong , pro-poor expenditure in election years is high and elections (in Zambia since 
2001) are ‘clean’, state fragility decreases and institutional development improves over 
the measurement period. In Nigeria, where the pre-election stimulus is strong and the 
pro-poor expenditure ratio very low, state fragility and institutional development as a 
whole worsen over the measurement period30.  In the four cases mentioned above, this 
argument applies to both the ‘state fragility’ and the ‘tax capacity’ measures of 
institutional development. Indeed, a casual inspection of the scattergrams linking pro-
poor expenditure (PPE) with the two measures of institutional capacity suggests that 
they are both linearly related, with positive changes in PPE tending to be negatively 
associated with increases in state fragility and positively associated with the tax ratio. 
However, although this trend is formally statistically significant, it is rather loose. Among 
the more interesting outliers, Ethiopia is associated over the entire 1990-2008 period 
with deteriorating pro-poor ratios and improving institutional performance. However, 
there are many ups and downs around the trend during this period, and various 
occurrences not picked up by the data: for example, the violence surrounding the 2005 
election and the restrictions on personal freedom prevailing since that time do not 
translate into an ‘institutional deterioration’ in terms of the indices used in Table 4, even 
though it was widely perceived as such by many Ethiopians.
                                                 
29
  The Polity IV index is displayed at  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
30
 For a discussion of the 2007 Nigerian election in this context, see the paper by Rawlence and Albin-Lackey 
(2007).  
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Empirical tests 
We now test these propositions more formally. The core of the story which we 
wish to test is the proposition informally illustrated in Table 4, that institutional capacity 
will not be damaged by the election cycle if the election does not excessively stir up 
perceptions of unfairness – either in the sense of electoral malpractice, or in the sense 
of excessive increases in perceived interpersonal inequity. Aid donors in Africa, as 
discussed in Section 2 above, are much involved in determining both these variables, 
as they can be expected to reward good governance and actions which raise the pro-
poor expenditure ratio, and their funding decisions in turn, as illustrated in Table 2, can 
shelter recipient governments against having to reverse a pre-election expenditure 
boost during the months after the election. 
 We thus have a three-equation model, two representing pre-election policy 
variable change, and one estimating the effect of the decisions of voters and aid donors 
on institutional capability. We can add a fourth, specifying the determinants of aid flows. 
In their simplest form, the functional forms of these three relationships can be 
represented as follows: 
 
Policy instruments (i.e. budget deficit and ratio of money supply to GDP) 
 
Ii,t = β0i + β1ELE i,t + β2ELEPOSTi,t + β j∑ X i,t + β iIi,t−k∑ + µi,t      (2) 
 
where: 
 
It = policy instruments specified; 
ELEi,t, = a dummy variable taking the value 1 in an election year and 0 in a non-election year; 
ELEPOST = a dummy variable taking the value 1 in a post-election year and 0 in a post-election year; 
X = vector of control variables including AIDPC, DEMOC and a trend variable; 
j=3, 4, …. n 
k= length of lag applying to the pre-election stimulus. 
 
This incorporates the functional form presented as (1) on page 5 above, and estimated 
by a fixed-effects estimator in Table 2. The process of adjustment of the policy variable 
over time depends, among other factors, on the difference between current and the 
equilibrium levels, thus introducing lags into the model. As mentioned earlier, the 
introduction of lags biases the coefficient(s) of the lagged variable(s). We address this 
problem by applying system GMM estimators which exploit all the information in the 
sample (Arellano and Bond, 1991) to produce more efficient estimates. 
 
Institutional quality 
 
ICi,t = α0 +α1PPEi,t + α2Di,t+ αIi,t+ ei,t                                           (3) 
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where  
IC = measure of institutional quality (defined here as  state fragility, tax ratio, quality of governance indicator, 
or pro-poor institutions index, as discussed on page 16  above. We prefer the tax ratio indicator because it 
performs better than the other measures, and it offers higher degrees of freedom); 
It =   policy measure which may be used as an instrument of the political business cycle, as in equation (1) 
above (here – budget deficit or money supply); 
  PPE = pro-poor expenditure coefficient, as discussed in Table 4 above; 
Dt  = measure of ‘cleanness’ or ‘dirtiness’ of elections. This is represented by a measure of democracy, 
meaning more democratic systems have cleaner elections. 
 
This is the proposition informally examined in Table 4 above. It suggests that 
institutional quality is not expected to be influenced by the mere fact of whether or not a 
political business cycle prevails. Whether institutional damage (a reduction in IC) 
occurs, rather, is likely to be determined by factors influencing the climate of the 
election, amongst which we have identified the extent to which the pre-election boost 
promotes a feeling of equity (PPEi,t) and whether the election is seen as clean or dirty 
(Dt), and these things, we have argued can be influenced by aid flows: 
 
Aid flows 
 
AIDPC i,t = φ0,i + φ1PPE i,t + φ2 AIDPC i,t−1 +φ 3IC i,t + φ x +1y i,t + ν i,t                      (4) 
 
 
where PPE and IC are, respectively, measures of pro-poor expenditure and of 
institutional quality as defined in relation to (3) above, and y is a vector of other control 
variables.  
 
Aid flows, as argued in Section 3, do not only determine the feasibility of the pre-
election boost for African countries, but are endogenous to the behaviour of African 
policy authorities. In particular, donors are anxious to reward good performance both in 
the sense of coherent strategies to reduce poverty and in the sense of a commitment to 
make the bureaucracy and electoral procedures transparent and open. To establish 
whether aid flows are not only associated with but are caused by PPE and institutional 
capacity, we lag aid by one period in the estimations. 
 
The introduction of lagged dependent variables as regressors makes the models 
dynamic and introduces dynamic panel bias. This complicates the estimation strategy, 
so we implement dynamic System GMM (General Method of Moments) techniques. 
Such estimation techniques make fewer assumptions about the data generating 
process, and are good at isolating useful information. They also allow for some 
endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation among the variables, problems 
which are present in our dataset31 . In Table 5, we report the results from estimation of 
equation (2) with the budget deficit as the dependent variable, using OLS, fixed effects, 
and system GMM estimators. The exogenous variables are deeper lags of the pre-
election stimulus, election year dummy, aid per capita, an index of democracy, and a 
                                                 
31
 Some of the data were collected from the World Bank Development indicators. WDI data for Africa are 
sometimes changed significantly when updated, thereby causing measurement errors when the updated data are 
introduced into a regression. 
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trend variable. In Table 6 we report the results from the estimation of equations (2) (with 
money supply as the dependent variable, using OLS, fixed effects and system GMM 
estimators), (3) and (4). Additional independent variables are infant mortality, GDP 
growth, state fragility measure, and pro-poor expenditure. As a check of the quality of 
theoretically superior estimators, Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006) suggested that a 
good parameter estimate of the dependent variable should fall between the OLS and 
fixed effects parameter estimates. Therefore, we apply the OLS, Fixed Effects, and 
System GMM estimators to our policy instrument equations.  
 
We allow for fixed individual effects so that the dependent variable may change faster 
for some units than others. Since the number of time periods is relatively large for some 
countries, a shock to the fixed effects, with lagged dependent variables, causes further 
endogeneity problems. We instrument for the lagged variables and other endogenous 
variables by drawing instruments from the dataset. Unlike with two stage least squares, 
deeper lags provide good instruments, and can be included without losing many 
degrees of freedom. To address instrument validity issues, and as suggested by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), we include lagged levels as well as lagged differences as 
instruments. This is premised on the assumption that the first differences are not 
correlated with the fixed effects. In addition, our specified policy equations are over-
identified because if they were just-identified, it would be impossible to detect invalid 
instruments. Although too many instruments weaken the Hansen-Sargan identification 
test, Roodman (2006) suggests a number of other ways of testing and controlling 
instrument validity which we apply. We also rely on the more robust Arellano-Bond test 
for autocorrelation over the Hansen-Sargan tests in detecting the validity of lagged 
instruments. 
 
We apply orthogonal deviations transformation of the data as a way of avoiding 
magnifying gaps in unbalanced data. This approach, as opposed to first-difference 
transformation, preserves degrees of freedom in panels with gaps, like ours. It also 
offers finer control of the instruments matrix (Roodman, 2006). It is assumed that the 
deviations of instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995), and we allow for Windmeijer finite-sample correction to the reported 
standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2006) to reduce bias. 
 
Since the effective number of time periods is relatively large, we know that dynamic 
panel data bias is insignificant (Roodman, 2006), and a more straight-forward fixed 
effects estimator could work perfectly, and we compare these results with system GMM 
results.  
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Table 5: Estimation of equation 2 with fiscal deficit as the dependent variable, 1980-
2008 
Dependent variable Budget deficit Budget deficit Budget deficit 
 OLS FE  System GMM 
Budget deficit lagged 0.732*** 0.458*** 0.639*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0515) (0.229) 
Election year dummy -0.370 -0.602* -0.575 
 (0.341) (0.332) (0.632) 
Post-election year dummy 1.505*** 1.093** 1.240**  
 (0.363) (0.407) (0.574) 
Aid per capita 0.010 0.008 0.039**  
 (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0153) 
Aid per capita lagged -0.009 -0.009 -0.040*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0105) (0.0142) 
Index of democracy -0.001 0.015 0.005    
 (0.0480) (0.0570) (0.0824) 
Time variable 0.033* 0.053 0.051    
 (0.0198) (0.0326) (0.0757) 
Constant -2.747*** -4.508*** -3.696 
 (0.991) (1.436) (4.182)  
Observations 471 471 471    
Chi2   134.336 *** 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions   18.281    
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions   40.543    
 
The results confirm what we got after estimating equation 1, except that the election 
year dummy is now weakly significant (using the fixed effects estimator). They confirm 
that the fiscal deficit worsens in the election year. Also, there will be significant attempt 
to balance the books after the election year. Using the system GMM estimator, it 
emerges that an increase in aid is significantly and positively associated with an 
increase in the fiscal deficit, after controlling for all other variables.  
 
Table 6 shows the results when the policy variable is money supply.  
 
Table 6: Estimation of equations 2 (with money supply as the dependent variable), 3 
and 4, 1980-2008 
  
Dependent variable MS/GDP MS/GDP MS/GDP Aid equation State fragility equation 
 OLS FE System GMM System GMM System GMM 
Money supply to GDP lagged 0.996*** 0.872*** 0.933***                  
 (0.00876) (0.0516) (0.0501)                  
Money supply to GDP     0.004    
     (0.0108)    
Election year dummy 0.063 0.121 0.086  -1.451**  
 (0.220) (0.203) (0.207)  (0.648)    
Post-election year dummy -0.470* -0.473* -0.426*  -0.878*   
 (0.257) (0.236) (0.226)  (0.489)    
Aid per capita  -0.001 -0.002 0.0001                  
 (0.00270) (0.00266) (0.00812)                  
Aid per capita lagged 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.910***                 
 (0.00251) (0.00228) (0.00706) (0.0269)                 
GDP growth -0.112*** -0.120*** -0.124***                  
 (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0277)                  
Index of democracy 0.071** 0.037 0.008                  
 (0.0302) (0.0845) (0.236)                  
Time variable 0.049*** 0.046* 0.123                  
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 (0.0180) (0.0259) (0.0978)                  
Net pro-poor expenditure    -0.024 0.054    
    (0.205) (0.0416)    
Budget deficit    0.061 -0.027    
    (0.192) (0.0509)    
Infant mortality    0.022                 
    (0.0589)                 
Measure of state fragility    -0.019                 
    (0.665)                 
Lagged state fragility measure     0.946*** 
     (0.0583)    
Constant -1.752* 1.672 -3.998 1.985 0.796    
 (0.950) (1.731) (3.692) (4.910) (0.846)    
Observations 662 662 662 337 266    
Chi2   1978.802*** 2776.809*** 1973.971*** 
Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions 
  31.326 19.638 13.293    
Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions 
  21.610 53.023 16.923    
 
Notes and sources: 
(1)Pre-election stimulus: 1 in election years, 0 in non-election years: data from table 1 above. 
(2) Post-election stimulus: 1 in post-election years, 0 in other years: data from table 1 above. 
(3)‘Pro-poor expenditure ratio’ = (public expenditure)* expenditure share, where expenditure 
share=(education+health+social protection- military)/total expenditure. 
(4) ‘Dirtiness’ of election: subjective index; see case-study data in table 4 above. 
(5) Aid per capita: from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
(6) State fragility index = This is conceived as a measure of exposure to conflict and the capacity of  
state institutions to manage that conflict. Exposure to conflict is transcribed from the PRIO  
ucdp_loc index on the scale 3=war, 2= intermediate conflict, 1= minor conflict, 0 = no significant  
civil conflict. The capacity of state institutions to manage and anticipate conflict is taken from the  
POLITY IV index32 and measured on a seven-point scale, where 7 denotes ‘extreme  
incapacity/fragility’’ and  0 denotes ‘high institutional capacity/little or no fragility’ on that index of  
state capacity. Adding the exposure index to the state capacity index thus produces a 10-point  
‘composite fragility scale’, with 10 the upper extreme and 0 the lower extreme, which is the  
measure reported in the table.   
(7) Infant mortality: from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
(8) Country size (population): from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
(9) Index of democracy (democ in equation 1): from www.systemicpeace.org 
 
The results show that although there is a positive but insignificant relationship between 
the policy variable and the election year dummy, there is significant disinflation in the 
year following elections, even after controlling for economic growth. In addition, state 
fragility increases following elections, possibly because of competition among different 
players and in some cases, oppression of opposition forces. This could also be a result 
of narrowing democratic space, and government choice to reduce tax collection effort as 
a way of buying votes.  
  
From these regressions the following conclusions emerge. In the first place, the election 
cycle with fiscal deficit as the policy variable is enhanced when we control for country 
fixed effects. The pre-election boost is less significant in the full model (including all 
countries) than when we consider only countries with no dominant political parties 
(Table 2). However, when the pre-election boost is money supply growth, as in Table 2, 
                                                 
32
  The Polity IV index is displayed at  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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the election year dummy is statistically insignificant for the full model, but there is a 
significant cut in the budget in post-election years. 
Second, there is no evidence of any significant overall negative impact of the 
election cycle on institutions.  The coefficients of the pre-election stimuli have the 
expected impact on institutional capacity (the state fragility measure), but the impacts 
are statistically insignificant. We thus have reasonable confidence in our claim that pre-
election boosts in the budget deficit do not make the state more fragile.  
Third, aid flows are positively correlated with fiscal deficits, but only with money 
supply when we use system GMM estimation. Aid flows are also insignificantly and 
negatively correlated with state fragility. As described in our case studies, donors like to 
reward behaviour which helps to create a strong state and to deliver on the Millennium 
Development Goals. It also appears from our case-studies, although the econometric 
evidence on this point is unclear, that measures to make elections more transparent 
and more clean have the same effect of insulating the political business cycle from its 
potential negative consequences.  
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4. Conclusions 
          The African political business cycle emerges from this analysis as country-
specific, and not universal. In some countries, under dominant-party systems, there is 
no need for it, since the incumbent can reasonably expect to be able to win elections 
without it; and in others, where the central bank is able to impose binding constraints on 
budgetary expansion, it is not feasible.  Averaged across all African countries, a pre-
election stimulus, we find, is still a feature of the political landscape. But there are wide 
variations around this central tendency, which it has been the main purpose of this 
paper to investigate. 
In the context of fragile economic systems, which most African countries are, the  
fear has been expressed that the extension of democracy, specifically by means of the 
political business cycle, might damage institutional development and make the state 
more fragile still. Across the sample as a whole, we find that this fear is unfounded. 
There are individual cases, such as Nigeria, where the qualitative evidence suggests 
that a negative relationship between  pre-election stimulus and measures of institutional 
development is apparent, but across the sample as a whole, no significant relationship 
is perceptible between the pre-election stimulus and institutional quality, whatever 
specification of institutional quality is used. 
           In Africa at least, the course of the political business cycle appears to be 
intimately connected with the perceived fairness according to which the political game is 
conducted, and also with the perceived equity with which state expenditures are 
allocated. Donors have the power, through their aid allocations, to influence both of 
these.  We predict that where the composition of the pre-election stimulus is pro-poor, 
institutional damage from a pre-election stimulus is unlikely to result. In terms of our 
measures of institutional quality, this prediction is fulfilled. 
In those cases where, with the help of reforms in electoral procedure, elections 
have become more transparent and the allocation of state resources has become more 
pro-poor ( Botswana and Mauritius in the 1970s and 80s;  more recently, with donor 
support, Ghana, Rwanda, Mozambique and Zambia) the surges in expenditure which 
occurred prior to elections  can be seen as an institutional asset rather than a liability, 
as they have been mainly pro-poor expenditures, which have then (Table 2), become 
embedded in the budget thanks to donors bestowing their blessing,  and not had to be 
cut back in the post-election years . Indeed, in several poorer LDCs where the right 
chemistry forms between donors and recipients, a virtuous circle can be observed in 
which aid donors, favourably impressed both by improvements in anti-poverty 
performance and in governance, help to counter-balance the political business cycle by 
establishing stable long-term aid contracts, of the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) type. 
In Africa, as the literature has stressed, the political business cycle has the 
potential to impose additional strains on already vulnerable institutions. This represents 
a distinctive threat to institutional capacity,  not often encountered in industrial countries. 
Yet, in many African countries, we find that these risks have not materialised. Rather 
those countries have been able, often in synergy with aid donors, to improvise 
institutional buffers against those risks. One of those buffers – the design of pro-poor 
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expenditure patterns which send a ‘distributional signal’ to interest-groups – is an 
innovation which, potentially, may also have relevance outside Africa. 
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